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Loan Guarantee Schemes in the UK: 
The Natural Experiment of the Enterprise Finance Guarantee and the 5 Year Rule 
 
Abstract 
Loan guarantee schemes have existed since 1953 (in the US) and are widely used throughout  
the world to provide financial support to smaller firms by guaranteeing loans from 
commercial banks. The UK government has been an active supporter of loan guarantees since 
1981, and has a long track record of modifying its scheme to reflect changing market 
conditions and the financing needs of its SME sector. Arguably the two most significant 
changes occurred in 2008 when the 5 Year Rule on eligibility was removed and in 2009 when 
the long-standing Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLG) was replaced by the 
Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme (EFG). We treat the removal of the 5 Year Rule as a 
natural policy experiment and empirically question whether, on economic grounds, this was a 
sensible policy. Our findings suggest that the 5 Year Rule was a better policy choice with 
regard to employment but had no impact on sales growth.  
Key Words: Small Business; Financing; Loan Guarantee Programmes; Experiment 
JEL Classification: M21; G2; G3 
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Loan Guarantee Schemes in the UK: 
The Natural Experiment of the Enterprise Finance Guarantee and the 5 Year Rule 
 
Introduction 
Firms operate in increasingly competitive and challenging markets where owner-
managers need to make difficult decisions in the obtaining and allocating of resources, 
including access to finance (Cowling et al., 2012; Keasey et al., 2015). The ‘pecking order 
hypothesis’ of Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that firms will prefer debt to equity capital. 
Berger and Udell (1998), in their life-cycle theory of small business financing, predict and 
empirically validate that younger and smaller firms will tend to rely more on debt financing 
for information based reasons, and Diamond (1991) suggests that use of debt helps build 
credibility through bank monitoring.  All these theories are widely supported empirically 
(Cole 2011, Bitler et al. 2001; La Rocca et al. 2009; Williams and Cowling, 2009). The 
inadequacy of internal funds to finance productive investment opportunities has led to the 
common concern raised in the small business literature that capital market imperfections exist 
and limit the availability of finance to small firms (Laeven, 2003; Love 2003; Cowling et al., 
2012). 
Credit rationing refers to the phenomenon where some borrowers receive loans while 
others do not, all else being equal (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Wellalage and Locke, 2016; 
Mertzanis, 2016; Gu et al., 2016). The most widely used, and long-standing, public policy 
mechanism worldwide for supporting small firms is, the loan guarantee scheme. Concerns 
about the impact on SME growth arising from credit rationing have been used to support the 
case for loan guarantee programmes throughout the developed (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; 
Riding, 2006) and developing, world (Klapper, 2006; Honaghan, 2008). The common feature 
of this type of intervention in debt capital markets has been the provision of loan security to 
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smaller firms who would not otherwise be able to obtain debt finance through conventional 
means (Riding, 1998). The major benefits of public financing initiatives have been identified 
as supporting growth that would not have been achieved in the absence of interventions and 
acting as a catalyst for broader economic development (Wonglimpiyarat, 2006). Well 
established examples of these schemes include the SBA 7(a) loan programme in the US, 
founded in 1953; the Canadian core guarantee programme (CSBFP), founded in 1961; and 
the UK Small Firm Loan Guarantee (SFLG) programme, founded in 1981. The most active 
loan guarantee program in the world is the Japanese Credit Supplementation System (Nitami 
and Riding, 2005).  
The SFLG has been analysed in a series of empirical papers by Cowling (2007; 2008; 
2010), Cowling and Siepel (2013) and Cowling and Mitchell (2003).  Cowling and Mitchell 
(2003) found that default increases with the banks cost of capital (the loan rate) but not with 
the government premium. In addition, default was also found to increase in periods of 
macroeconomic growth, suggesting that in economic upturns the marginal SFLG borrower is 
of lower quality as banks relax their lending criteria. Cowling (2007) explored the role of 
loan commitments (overdrafts) on the UK SFLG as a means of insuring borrowers against 
future credit rationing. The key findings were; that ex post default had no bearing on initial 
credit volumes advanced, nor was there an obvious trade-off between loan margins (risk 
premia) and loan amount. But the availability of collateral for firms which wish to borrow 
debt under commitment contracts is absolutely crucial to their ability to raise substantial 
amounts of funding. Holding all else constant, not having any collateral reduces a firm’s 
maximum borrowing by half. This is supportive of the role of SFLG in allowing certain types 
of small firm borrower’s access to bank funding under commitment. In a further two papers, 
Cowling (2008; 2010), replicated the Berger and Udell (1992) US loan market study using 
UK SFLG data. The author concluded that in the presence of the SFLG, credit rationing in 
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not an explanation consistent with the loan market for most small businesses in the UK.  
However, there is a small pool of borrowers who, due to information problems, will always 
find it more difficult to raise bank funds when credit markets are tightening, even in the 
presence of SFLG.  
In the last decade experiments have become increasingly popular because they allow 
the overcoming of many identification concerns that may arise with nonexperimental 
approaches (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008).  The literature has developed in management 
(Mayo, 1933; Bakker et al., 2013), strategy (Chatterji et al., 2016), economics (Bloom et al., 
2013; Levitt and List, 2009; Prendergast, 1999), and public policy (Ludwig et al., 2011).  
Arguably, the two most significant changes to the SFLG occurred in 2008 when the 5 
Year Rule on eligibility was removed and in 2009 when the longstanding SFLG was replaced 
by the Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme (EFG). EFG saw a raising of the maximum firm 
and loan size thresholds and provides the basis of our experiment. Given that credit guarantee 
programmes are such a widely used form of policy intervention in developed, and 
developing, countries it is important to assess their effectiveness in the light of a long-
standing research base that shows that growth of small firms is generally constrained by 
access to internal capital (Carpenter and Peterson, 2002). 
Our experiment poses the following research question: What would have happened if 
the 5 Year Rule had remained in place and the maximum firm, and loan, size restrictions had 
been maintained at the original thresholds? 
 Our findings indicate that the 5 Year Rule was a better policy choice in respect of job 
creation, but had no impact in regard to sales growth. We contribute to extending experiments 
to the national decision-making level and provide suggestions for practitioners and policy 
makers on loan support schemes which are arguably the most important vehicle to ameliorate 
the problem of credit rationing.   
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Experiment background and hypothesis 
UK Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLG) 
The empirical context for our paper is the UK Small Firm Loan Guarantee scheme. The 
SFLG, established in 1981, was the government’s primary debt finance instrument until its 
name change in 2009 to the Enterprise Guarantee Scheme (EGS).  SFLG addressed the 
market failure in the provision of debt finance by providing a Government guarantee to banks 
in cases where a business with a viable business plan is unable to raise finance because they 
cannot offer security for their debt and/ or lack a track record. This rationale still underpinned 
the SFLG at the time of the change to EFG. In the SFLG, the government pays covers 75% 
and borrowing businesses pay a premium which is 2% over the commercial bank rate. Over 
the last decade, take up of the scheme has averaged around 4,500 loans per year, although 
there have been fluctuations between individual years. In January 2009, SFLG was replaced 
by the Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG), which opened the scheme to a wider number of 
businesses, with the specific objective to facilitate new bank lending in response to the Credit 
Crunch. 
 
The Five Year Rule and the Graham Review 
After 22 years from 1981, during which SFLG loan take-up had exhibited considerable 
volatility, reaching a nadir in 1985 of 543 loans and a peak in 1995 of 7,680 loans, the UK 
government announced a major review of the operations of its SFLG scheme led by Teresa 
Graham in December 2003. Concern was expressed by Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) that 
default rates were excessively high at a rate of 34% compared to normal commercial bank 
loans to SMEs and that this high default rate exposed the Treasury to a much larger capital 
commitment (contingent liability) than was acceptable on an ongoing basis given the 
guarantee rate of 75% on outstanding balances against a maximum loan size under guarantee 
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of £250,000. The Review published its interim findings in February 2004 after wide 
consultation, and to a large extent these findings remained in the final report. 
The key recommendation of the Graham Review (2004) which was accepted by 
HMT, and implemented on 1st December 2005, was that; 
The focus of the scheme will move to start-ups and young businesses. This will see 
the availability of SFLG limited to those SMEs under five years old, as these are the 
businesses which have had least opportunity to build up a financial track record and 
assets against which to secure borrowing. 
The Reviews recommendation for focusing the SFLG on firms up to five years old was well 
grounded in both theory and empirical evidence in that capital structure theories predicted 
that younger and smaller firms would have a preference for debt funding once they had 
exhausted all available sources of internal funds, and that credit rationing, if observed, would 
be most apparent amongst younger and smaller, information opaque, firms (Ughetto, 2009). 
Equally, it was also evident that it was younger and smaller firms that were most likely to be 
constrained in obtaining conventional bank loans by a lack of collateralisable assets.  Both of 
these criteria were enshrined in the rationale for the original SFLG. There was also a belief in 
HMT and more widely that by restricting access to a subset of the SME population that were 
likely to face the most severe rationing in debt markets the net economic benefits 
(additionality) per £1 of public money would be proportionally higher as partially rationed, 
lower growth, older and larger SMEs would be excluded. Finally, by restricting the scheme 
HMT capital exposure to default under guarantees would be proportionately smaller. 
So what happened after the introduction of the 5 Year Rule in December 2005? The 
data on loan issue (Fig 1) shows a dramatic collapse from 6,698 loans in 2005 to 2,647 by 
2008, a fall of 60.5% in loan numbers. This collapse in SFLG loans under guarantee had the 
desired effect of reducing HMT contingent liabilities to a historically low figure of £183 
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million on 4,305 defaulting loans, but questions about its’ relevance as a public sector 
financial support instrument were asked given its new operational scale. These questions led 
directly to an Early Stage Assessment of the 5 Year Rule (Cowling et al., 2008) which 
concluded that; 
The majority, but not all, those interviewed did not consider the introduction of Five 
Year Rule as a change for the better, and the general feeling was that the rules about 
what constitutes a new business are too basic and restrictive. 
These considerations were taken into account in the Enterprise Strategy, published in 
March 2008, which announced a relaxation of the 5 Year Rule to allow for older, growth 
orientated, small businesses. The effect was immediate and loan numbers rose significantly 
and immediately (see Fig 1). With the additional shock of the financial crash in September 
2008, loans under guarantee returned to their pre-5 Year Rule levels within that year. In the 
face of the global financial crisis in the banking sector the UK government response was 
immediate and in January 2009 the Enterprise Finance Guarantee replaced the original SFLG. 
But the remit of EFG was much broader and allowed a maximum loan under guarantee of 
£1m (from £250,000 under SFLG). Firm size restrictions were also raised from £5.6m sales 
to £41m. The explicit aim was to broaden support for the SME sector in raising bank loans in 
the face of an increasing unwillingness to lend by commercial banks faced with uncertain 
liabilities. 
--------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
--------------------------- 
It is these two policy changes, the removal of the 5 Year Rule and the raising of the 
maximum firm and loan size thresholds under EFG that provide us with our natural 
experiment. Our experiment poses one simple question and one working hypothesis; 
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Question: What would have happened if the 5 Year Rule had remained in place and 
the maximum firm, and loan, size restrictions been maintained at original SFLG thresholds? 
 
Hypothesis H1: As younger and smaller firms grow faster on average than older and larger 
firms, those firms that would have fallen within the original SFLG scope will outperform 
those firms that only became eligible under the new rules and EFG. 
 
Data and Methodology 
To address our first research question, we draw upon two sets of linked data. The first set of 
data is drawn from the UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) Enterprise 
Finance Guarantee (EFG) scheme Management Information records. This is supplemented by 
survey data from a recent evaluation of EFG (Allinson et al. 2013) which includes 500 EFG 
recipient firms and 899 non-EFG firms. The data was weighted to allow the evaluation team 
to generalise their findings back to the total EFG population. 
The research was conducted by IFF Research via telephone interviews with 
businesses who had received an EFG backed loan in 2009 and also with a matched sample of 
non-EFG users from the general business population. The non-user sample was matched in 
terms of business age, legal status of business i.e. whether limited or unlimited and by broad 
business sector. The ‘non-user’ businesses were sourced from Dun & Bradstreet's business 
database. The main fieldwork was conducted during February and March 2012. The 
questionnaire was fully piloted prior to the start of the main fieldwork.  
Table 1 shows the number of sample records available, the number of EFG businesses 
for whom we were able to source a telephone number for (using both automated and manual 
telephone look-up approaches), the approximate number of records lost due to unusable 
sample (unobtainable telephone number, duplicate records etc.) and the number of interviews 
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completed within each of the sample groups along with the associated response rates. 
Response rates have been calculated by dividing the number of completed interviews by the 
total number of contacts for which a definite outcome was achieved during the fieldwork 
period. Overall, 71% of EFG users and 41% of non-EFG users responded to the survey. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 Here 
-------------------------- 
Response Bias Tests 
We employed chi-square and Mann-Whitney U tests and found no statistically significant 
response bias between EFG user respondents and EFG non-respondents with regard to the 
location of the businesses as captured by the Government Office Region (GOR), industrial 
activity, and the number of employees at the 0.05 level or better. The same tests were also 
undertaken between the control group respondents and control group non-respondents, and 
there was no evidence of response bias at the 0.05 level or better.  
Measures 
Dependent variables 
We focus on two dependent variables that are commonly used – employment growth and 
sales revenue growth (Achtenhagen et al, 2010; Delmar, 1997; Unger et al, 2011; 
Weinzimmer et al, 1998). Respondents were asked to provide information on the number of 
employees in 2009 and 2012. Using a simple change from base year to current year measure 
has the potential to capture regression to the mean effects and pick up transitory shocks to the 
firms employment. To address this potential problem we adopt the ‘current year average size’ 
measure outlined in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). This takes a firm employment 
average of t-1 and t. Respondents were also given questions relating to the level of sales 
revenue in 2009 and 2012. The firm sales average for 2009 and 2012 was also calculated 
(Sales Growth). 
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Independent variable 
The next step was to create a dummy variable to test our natural experiment (EXPERIMENT 
DUMMY). Taking the full set of 500 EFG recipient firms, we then created our new policy 
dummy variable by coding those EFG recipients that were 5 years old or less at the point of 
loan receipt and had a loan not exceeding £250,000 with a ‘1’. This reflects the original 
SFLG scheme parameters when the so called “Graham 5 Year Rule” was in place. All other 
recipients of EFG not falling within these original parameters were coded as ‘0’. Here we 
note that of the 492 EFG recipients with full data, 142 were coded as ‘1’ in our Experiment 
dummy variable, which represents 28.86% of the EFG sample, and 350 firms were coded ‘0’ 
as they would have been ineligible under the old scheme rules.  
 
Control variables 
The following control variables were included in our models because of established 
precedent.  Firms’ activities and environment may shape their capacity to grow and 
accordingly the main business activities were coded into their main division categories as 
follows: Mining and Quarrying; Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, C and E (Mining 
Utilities), Manufacturing, D (Manufacturing), Construction, F (Construction), Wholesale and 
Retail Trade; and Repairs, G (Retail-Wholesale), Hotels and restaurants, H (Hotels), 
Transport, Storage and Communication, I (Transport), Real Estate, Renting and Business 
Activities, K (Real Estate), and Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities, O 
(Other Services). The number of employees in 2009 was reported (Firm Size). The firm age 
was also reported (Firm Age). 
Entrepreneurs’ human capital may influence employment and sales revenue growth 
and the following general and specific human variables were operationalized: entrepreneurs 
aged 18-44 were coded as ‘1’ and otherwise ‘0’ (18-44 Years), those aged 45-54 years old 
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were coded as ‘1’ and otherwise ‘0’ (45-54 Years), those aged 55-65 years old were code as 
‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise, and entrepreneurs aged 66 years or older were coded as ‘1’ and 
otherwise ‘0’ (AGE 66+ Years). Entrepreneurs for whom their highest level of educational 
achievement was a university degree or higher were coded as ‘1’ and otherwise ‘0’ (Degree). 
The number of years of entrepreneurial experience was used to create three variables. 
Entrepreneurs with 0-9 years of entrepreneurial experience were coded as ‘1’ and otherwise 
‘0’ (0-9 Years EE); those with 10-15 years of entrepreneurial experience were coded as ‘1’ 
and ‘0’ otherwise (10-15 Years EE); and those with 16 or more years of entrepreneurial 
experience were coded as ‘1’ and otherwise ‘0’ (16+ Years EE). Entrepreneurs were asked, 
‘In the last 2 years, has your business introduced any new or significantly improved products 
or services?’ Entrepreneurs who indicated that they had ‘improved products or services’ were 
coded as ‘1’ and otherwise ‘0’ (Improved Products-Services). Entrepreneurs who indicated 
‘new products or services’ were coded as ‘1’ and otherwise ‘0’ (New Products-Services).  
Entrepreneurs who responded that they had ‘new and improved products or services’ were 
coded as ‘1’ and otherwise ‘0’ (New and Improved Products-Services). Entrepreneurs who 
had ‘no innovation’ were coded as ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise (No Innovation). We also include 
firm age as a continuous variable.  
 
Data and multicollinearity 
Summary statistics and a correlation matrix was computed and is shown in Table 2. 
The correlation coefficients and variance inflation factor scores suggest that the results 
reported in Table 2 are not subject to multicollinearity. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 Here 
-------------------------- 
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Results 
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the results of the employment growth between 2009 and 2012. The 
experiment dummy is statistically significant at the 0.001 level in Model 1. Model 2 in Table 
3 presents the results for the model of sales revenue growth between 2009 and 2012. The 
experiment dummy is statistically insignificant, but has a positive sign. Thus, the results 
presented in Table 3 support hypothesis H1 with regard to employment growth but reject it 
for sales revenue growth.  
  
Discussion 
Key findings 
Our aim has been to perform an experiment to answer the question: what would have 
happened if the 5 Year Rule had remained in place and the maximum firm, and loan, size 
restrictions had been maintained at the original SFLG thresholds.  In order to answer our 
research question and provide an indication of the causality between the 5 Year Rule and the 
performance of firms a variety of approaches could be employed. Instrumental variable (IV) 
approaches are problematic because of the need to identify instruments which can serve the 
designated purpose (Bascle, 2008), and the use of the wrong variables as instruments can 
generate problematic results. Experiments offer an alternative route to IV approaches. 
Specifically, our paper has tested and found support for hypothesis H1 with regard to 
employment. This did not hold for sales growth. Our results suggest that the UK government 
would have had a greater impact on employment growth if they had maintained the 5 Year 
Rule. Credit guarantee schemes continue to be a popular form of intervention around the 
world but in the case of the UK the decision to replace the 5 Year Rule was not consistent 
with maximising the employment effects of intervention. Our results suggest that policy 
makers in the USA, Canada, France, Germany and Sweden as well as Asian countries such as 
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India, Korea and Indonesia should also reflect upon the eligibility criteria for their credit 
guarantee schemes in their quests to ameliorate the problem of credit rationing.  
 
Limitations and implications for future research 
This study has looked at an experiment related to employment and sales revenue growth. But, 
clearly there are a wide range of other measures of business performance which can be used 
such as the level of profitability, exporting and non-economic measures including satisfaction 
of owner-managers and employees with various dimensions of their jobs. These limitations 
offer opportunities to replicate and extent our study to the relaxing of the 5 Year Rule with 
regard to other measures of business performance. Future studies could also include 
qualitative case studies of firms to see whether firms which were 5 years old or less at the 
point of loan receipt and had a loan not exceeding £250,000 did have superior economic and 
non-economic business performance compared to other types of firms who were, and were 
not in receipt of government loans. This experiment was applied to the UK but changes in 
similar loan guarantee programmes schemes such as the SBA in the USA and the CSBFP in 
Canada or the other 43 countries identified by Beck et al. (2008) can also be explored using 
an experiment framework. By looking at experiments in different continents and countries 
with similar, as well as different cultures this can help to see how different business 
environments and cultures influence changes in policy using experiment frameworks of 
analysis. Clearly policy makers face difficult decisions but applying experiment frameworks 
will assist them in the allocation of resources and facilitate employment retention and 
employment growth. Furthermore, extending the study by tracking the EFG users and non-
users over time will allow longitudinal studies to see whether the insights suggested in our 
paper hold over the longer time period. Additionally, in tracking the EFG users and non-users 
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questions can be harvested on management strategies and practices to see how those 
measures influence business performance within the experiment set up in this paper. 
 
Implications for practice and policy and conclusions 
Our research has contributed to the experiment literature and to provide recommendations for 
policy makers and practitioners with regard to the UK provision of credit guarantee schemes 
which have been championed as a way to overcome, in part, the credit rationing 
phenomenon. The UK has since 1981 provided a loan guarantee scheme but the relaxing of 
the 5 Year Rule and the replacement of the SFLG with the EFG was questionable if 
maximising the employment effects of the intervention was a primary motivation. The 
maximum firms, and loans, size restrictions which are operated by the EFG might be reduced 
to the previous levels operated with the SFLG if job creation is the main policy objective. 
Our research findings have found that the 5 Year Rule was a good policy choice for jobs and 
created more employment value to those small firms with the greatest need and potential. 
 Central government support schemes and development agencies (Bennett, 2014) can 
provide important assistance for SMEs. Credit guarantee schemes represent one of the most 
widely used form of policy intervention, globally, in developed as well as developing 
countries. The credit rationing problem continues to be a global problem, both before, and 
after, the credit crunch and the need for credit guarantee schemes continues. Without the 
capital formation of small firms (Graham, 2004) firms less than required levels of capital will 
result in less jobs being created, and lower levels of sales revenue. The Graham Review 
(2004) recommendations of focusing upon SMEs under five years has been at least partially 
vindicated by our results. Credit schemes beyond the UK will benefit from the lesson that 
focusing upon younger and smaller sized firms may also achieve better output performance 
with regard to employment. 
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Fig 1: UK Loan Guarantee Scheme Take-Up of Loans, 2002-2009 
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Table 1: Comparison of EFG Users and Non-Users 
 EFG Users Non-Users 
 SAMPLE CLEANING  
Total in-scope records 
provided 
(guaranteed/repaid) 
6,504 11,306 
Telephone number found 3,398 n/a 
 CATI SCREENING  
Selection for CATI 3,398 11,306 
Unusable – ineligible for 
interview, business contact 
details incorrect, number 
unobtainable, etc. 
855 
 
1,495 
 ACHIEVED 
INTERVIEWS/RESPONSE 
RATE 
 
Total useable sample 2,543 9,811 
Sample with a definite 
outcome (completed 
interview, refusal, 
terminated interview) 
709 
 
2,254 
 
Interviews achieved 500 899 
Response rate (%) 71% 41% 
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Table 2  
 Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Employment Growth 28.026 55.080             
2. Sales Growth 2312113 4401826 .558            
3. Mining Utilities 0.03 0.17 .098 .003           
4. Manufacturing  0.22 0.41 -.055 -.022 -.092          
5. Construction  0.07 0.26 -.046 -.001 -.048 -.146         
6. Retail-Wholesale  0.23 0.42 -.082 .005 -.096 -.294 -.152        
7. Hotels 0.05 0.22 .026 -.049 -.040 -.121 -.063 -.126       
8. Transport 0.05 0.22 .129 .140 -.041 -.124 -.064 -.129 -.053      
9. Real Estate 0.24 0.43 -.005 .014 -.098 -.298 -.154 -.310 -.128 -.129     
10. Other Services 0.11 0.31 .063 -.069 -.060 -.183 -.095 -.191 -.079 -.080 -.194    
11. Firm Size 25.95 49.46 .932 .552 .096 -.055 -.047 -.072 .032 .150 .000 .024   
12. Firm Age 11.203 19.025 .243 .234 .105 .016 -.013 -.024 -.018 .051 -.034 -.009 .275  
13. 18-44 years 0.29 0.46 -.094 -.042 -.038 -.038 -.027 .073 .001 -.063 .003 .035 -.124 -.166 
14. 45-54 years 0.35 0.48 .098 .070 .012 .000 -.037 .035 .030 .040 .001 -.023 .111 .019 
15. 55-65 years 0.28 0.45 .003 -.019 .044 .018 -.012 -.029 -.051 .024 .014 .000 .011 .102 
16. 66+ years 0.08 0.27 -.005 -.021 .011 .034 .001 -.014 .031 .003 -.029 -.018 .004 .079 
17. Degree 0.56 0.50 .141 .132 .031 -.034 -.080 -.141 -.035 -.022 .164 .090 .128 .010 
18. 0-9 years EE 0.22 0.41 -.119 -.088 -.029 -.047 -.063 .069 .068 -.07 -.068 .043 -.159 -.179 
19. 10-15 years EE 0.22 0.41 -.043 -.055 -.018 .006 -.027 -.008 -.029 -.019 .044 .010 -.031 -.056 
20. 16+ years EE 0.57 0.50 -.133 .118 .040 .034 -.075 -.050 -.033 .072 -.034 -.044 .159 .195 
21. Improved products-
services 
0.12 0.33 -.011 .041 -.026 .053 -.022 -.073 -.043 -.007 -.051 -.033 -.013 -.056 
22. New and improved 
products-services 
0.24 0.40 .024 .007 -.039 -.003 -.043 -.062 .026 .012 .021 .091 .030 -.005 
23. New Products Services 0.21 0.43 .013 .005 -.038 .026 -.042 .004 .051 -.032 -.016 .024 -.007 -.048 
24. No innovation 0.43 0.50 -.020 -.043 .080 -.062 .084 -.020 -.025 .026 .043 -.062 -.002 -.086 
25. EXPERIMENT 
DUMMY 
0.29 0.45 -.152 -.164 -.039 -.092 .034 .089 -.016 -.043 .020 -.014 -.235 -.280 
 
 Notes: n=221; P<0.10=0.11, P< 0.05=0.14, P<0.01=0.18  
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Table 2 Cont. 
 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 
14. 45-54 years -.471            
15. 55-65 years -.398 -.544           
16. 66+ years -.191 -.218 -.184          
17. Degree .038 -.026 .030 -.076         
18. 0-9 years EE .416 -.111 -.213 -.150 .057        
19. 10-15 years EE .171 .050 -.150 -.124 .049 -.270       
20. 16+ years EE -.487 .052 .301 .227 -.089 -.604 -.602      
21. Improved products-services -.004 .037 -.010 .041 .072 -.006 .048 .051     
22. New and improved products-
services 
-.011 -.026 .032 .011 .044 -.075 .014 -.053 -.210    
23. New Products Services .047 .046 -.078 -.030 .072 .052 .013 -.035 -.209 -.021   
24. No innovation -.031 -.050 .053 .053 -.154 .007 -.061 -.045 -.325 -.487 -.032  
25. EXPERIMENT DUMMY .110 .019 -.134 -.036 .048 .137 .002 -.120 -.083 .018 .018 -.001 
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 Table 3: Estimates of OLS Models of Growth in Employment and Sales Revenue  
 Model 1  
(Employment Growth 
Model 2  
(Sales Growth) 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Manufacturing 0.770 1.532 -1707.184a 333.804 
Construction 1.653 1.664 -1692.770a 359.185 
Retail-Wholesale 0.196 1.535 -1722.416a 334.760 
Hotels 0.735 1.623 -2168.121a 351.336 
Transport 3.596c 2.111 91.273 425.454 
Real Estate 0.088 1.519 -1808.579a 331.563 
Other Services 1.415 1.578 -1916.976a 341.116 
Firm Size_2009 1.041a 0.009 56.760a 1.597 
Firm Age_2009 -0.010 0.008 0.352 1.591 
Entrepreneur Age: 45-54 years -0.403 0.402 -110.018 80.697 
Entrepreneur Age: 55-65 years -0.543 0.515 -212.538b 98.446 
Entrepreneur Age: 66+ years -1.587 1.072 -761.562a 223.838 
Entrepreneur Degree 0.889a 0.327 16.495 65.459 
Entrepreneur 10-15 years exp. -0.071 0.430 73.419 85.226 
Entrepreneur 16+ years exp. 0.118 0.466 191.230b 90.685 
Improved products-services -0.074 0.516 -192.257c 101.447 
New and improved products-services -0.098 0.414 -121.331 81.932 
No innovation -0.641 0.437 -136.773 88.140 
EXPERIMENT DUMMY 0.891a 0.354 44.650 69.024 
Constant -0.293 1.579 2117.484a 346.275 
N Obs 279  233  
F stat 851.98a  79.93a  
Robust standard errors are reported.. a Significant at the 0.01 level; b Significant at the 0.05 
level; and, c Significant at the 0.10 level. Comparison variables: Industrial Activity, 
Mining Utilities; Entrepreneur Experience, 0-9 Years EE; Entrepreneur Age, 18-44 
Years; Innovation, New Products Services. 
